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E
cuador and El Salvador have recently adopted
the U.S. dollar as legal tender, replacing their
own national currencies.1 This same move
has received serious attention in policy debates
in both Argentina and Mexico. Abandoning the
national currency is a decision with far-reaching
economic and political implications that are not
well understood. In response to this phenomenon,
a growing literature has aimed at evaluating the
economic costs and benefits of “dollarizing.” In
this article, we provide an overview of the emerg-
ing literature and point out some issues that we
feel warrant further research.2
Throughout, we focus on official dollarization,
where the U.S. dollar (or some other currency)
replaces the national currency as legal tender.
Unofficial dollarization, where private agents use
a foreign currency as a substitute for the domestic
currency, is already widespread in Latin America
and elsewhere. We focus on Latin America and the
U.S. dollar because of the recent events and policy
debates mentioned above. Most of the issues we
discuss, however, would apply to any country con-
sidering the official adoption of a foreign currency.
Discussions of the optimal monetary and
exchange rate arrangements for an emerging market
economy have traditionally centered on fixed or
flexible exchange rates or (most often) some hybrid
of the two, perhaps combined with capital controls
or other regulatory measures. We begin our discus-
sion by examining the causes of the current surge
of interest in official dollarization. We then turn to
the details of the issues that we feel are most impor-
tant in analyzing the potential costs and benefits of
dollarizing.
WHY CONSIDER DOLLARIZATION? 
Financial Crises
The current interest in official dollarization is
largely a reaction to the recent string of currency
crises. In the past decade, these crises have affected
numerous countries, both industrialized (Italy and
the United Kingdom in 1992) and emerging markets
(Mexico in 1994, and East Asia and Brazil in 1997).
Comparing the crises in industrialized countries
with those in emerging markets reveals an important
difference: although these crises are not costly in
terms of lost output for industrialized economies,
they are extremely costly for emerging market
economies.3 For example, in 1995 Mexican gross
domestic product (GDP) declined by 7 percent in real
per capita terms. (In the years before the crisis, for
comparison, real per capita growth ranged between
3 percent and 10 percent.) Moreover, when one
emerging economy suffers a crisis, others are often
hit by interest rate increases and a recession, as
happened in Argentina following the Mexican crisis.
This phenomenon is known as contagion.
The events in emerging market economies share
certain characteristics that allow us to identify a
typical “anatomy” of a crisis.4 Beforehand, there is
an incipient capital inflow and a corresponding
current account deficit. The onset of the crisis is
marked by a sudden capital outflow and a large
devaluation of the exchange rate. There is often a
crisis in the banking system at about the same time.5
The result is a sharp and painful fall in output. Much
of the current interest in dollarization stems from
a strong desire to avoid such crises in the future.
Before discussing the potential costs and benefits of
1 Guatemala has also recently adopted the U.S. dollar as legal tender,
but it has decided to maintain its own currency in circulation, with-
out fixing a parity with the dollar.
2 The interested reader can find a good, basic introduction to the topic
of dollarization in Chang (2000).
3 This reflects the general finding that an exchange rate devaluation is
usually contractionary for emerging markets, whereas it is typically
expansionary for industrialized countries. See, for example, Edwards
(1989).
4 For a detailed discussion, see Calvo (2000).
5 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) empirically show that banking crises
tend to precede exchange rate crises.
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approaches to these problems and why they seem
to be falling out of favor.
The Fear of Floating
One approach that naturally comes to mind
(to an economist, at least) is to allow prices and
quantities to be determined by supply and demand
in markets. The definition of a flexible exchange
rate system is exactly this: the price of one currency
relative to another is determined by the market with-
out any intervention by central banks. That is to
say, any current account deficit has to be financed
entirely by capital inflows (a financial account
surplus) and vice versa, without any change in
official reserves.
In reality, however, we do not observe many
countries with truly flexible exchange rate systems.
Rapid growth in world capital markets has led to
a substantial increase in the size of international
capital flows. At times, these flows become very
volatile; indeed, as we mentioned above, a sudden
reversal in capital flows is the typical “spark” of a
crisis. Under a pure flexible exchange rate system,
such volatility in capital flows causes corresponding
volatility in the exchange rate. A volatile exchange
rate, in turn, means that relative prices in the econ-
omy are volatile, which can be very disruptive to
real economic activity. 
Calvo and Reinhart (2000) have termed the
unwillingness to let exchange rates be completely
determined in markets “the fear of floating.” They
also point out several additional reasons why emerg-
ing market economies seem to be averse to floating
exchange rates. These include high levels of dollar-
denominated debt, high-exchange-rate pass through
(reflected in domestic inflation), and in general an
adverse effect of currency instability on credit market
access. In support of their argument, they conduct
an empirical analysis comparing the announced
exchange rate regime of countries to the actual
exchange rate behavior. Their findings indicate
that countries classified as letting their exchange
rate float, in general, do not. Hence it seems that
very few, if any, countries are willing to take this
approach.
The Costs of Capital Controls
Sudden reversals in the flow of capital have been
an important and particularly damaging aspect of
currency crises. If capital market volatility is the
problem, one way of avoiding it is to introduce capi-
tal controls. Clearly the aim of such a policy would
not be to stop capital inflows, because emerging
market economies rely on them for investment,
but to diminish their volatility. There is evidence
indicating that capital controls involving taxes and
reserve requirements can change the composition
of capital inflows in favor of long-term investment,
and thereby decrease the likelihood of large, sudden
outflows. Calvo and Reinhart (1999), however, cau-
tion that these results may depend on the account-
ing classifications of capital flows. In addition,
Edwards (1999) argues that, when analyzing the
maturity of a country’s foreign debt, the relevant
concept is residual maturity6 rather than contractual
maturity. Using data from Chile, Edwards shows
that short-term capital controls had a limited effect
on Chile’s residual maturity of foreign debt and that
Chile had higher residual maturity than Mexico (a
country without capital controls) at the end of 1996.
More generally, capital controls are typically
not considered sound economic policy because
they limit the ability of a country to borrow and
invest, they hinder international risk sharing and
technology transfer, and they prolong the survival
of unsustainable domestic policies. The main prac-
tical objection to capital controls, however, is that
they create a strong incentive for tax evasion and
require a costly enforcement apparatus. These prob-
lems make them poor candidates for permanent
solutions.7
The Vanishing Intermediate Regime
The unwillingness to let exchange rates float
and to use direct capital controls has pushed coun-
tries toward “intermediate” exchange rate regimes
in which official intervention is used to keep the
exchange rate within predetermined bounds. This
move, however, has been accompanied by the recent
crises mentioned previously. This association has led
many observers to claim that intermediate exchange
rate regimes are no longer viable for emerging mar-
ket economies. These observers claim that only
extreme (totally fixed or totally flexible) exchange
rate regimes are viable for emerging market econ-
omies. Eichengreen (forthcoming) colorfully likens
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6 Residual maturity is measured by the value of a country’s liabilities
that are held by foreigners and mature within a year.
7 See De Grauwe (1996, Chapter 11) and Neely (1999) for an extensive
assessment of capital controls. Calvo and Reinhart (1999) provide a
discussion related to the context of dollarization.adopting an intermediate regime to “painting a bull’s
eye on the forehead of the central bank governor
and telling speculators to ‘shoot here’.”8 There are, of
course, situations for which some authors are will-
ing to defend intermediate regimes as appropriate,
but they are generally viewed as temporary reme-
dies.9 Fischer (2001) presents empirical evidence
that the proportion of emerging market economies
using intermediate regimes has indeed declined
over the past decade.
An important question is how extreme a policy
must be in order to avoid the problems associated
with the middle ground. Even a currency board has
proven not to be extreme enough in some ways.
Under this arrangement, the central bank commits
to back its monetary base entirely with foreign
reserves at all times; thus, a unit of domestic cur-
rency can be introduced into the economy only if
an equivalent amount of foreign reserves is obtained.
In principle, this system is equivalent to dollariza-
tion. However, even though Argentina has been
operating under a currency board since 1991, the
interest rate differentials between peso-denominated
and dollar-denominated debt remain and have
widened during periods of financial turmoil, as with
the Brazilian and Mexican crises (see Figure 1). This
indicates that financial markets believe there to be
a significant probability that the currency board
will be abandoned under such circumstances, and
the Argentine economy has suffered as a result.
THE KEY ISSUES
We now turn to what we see as the key issues
in evaluating the costs and benefits of dollarization.
Two of the primary benefits of dollarization are
straightforward: exchange rate volatility (against the
dollar) and exchange rate crises would be eliminated,
and in most cases the inflation rate would be lowered
substantially. One of the costs is also fairly straight-
forward, although occasionally misunderstood: the
loss of seignorage revenue. We begin our discussion
with this issue.
There are other costs and benefits that are more
subtle and difficult to measure. Dollarization implies
the loss of monetary policy, but, if it enhances the
credibility of economic policy, dollarization could
lower interest rates and substantially decrease the
likelihood of future financial crises. If it increases
economic integration with the United States, dollar-
ization could yield substantial benefits in both
product and financial markets. An important con-
cern, however, is that dollarization would limit the
ability of the central bank to act as a lender of last
resort. We discuss these issues in turn below. Finally,
a discussion of dollarization would not be complete
without looking at the “initial conditions” in which
many emerging market economies currently find
themselves and approaching the issue from the
perspective of the United States.
Seignorage Revenue
An obvious cost of dollarization is the loss of
the seignorage revenue that comes with the power
to print fiat currency. The size of the flow of seignor-
age revenue depends on both the rate of growth of
output and the rate of inflation. For some emerging
market economies, it constitutes a substantial frac-
tion of government revenues. With any other fixed-
exchange-rate arrangement, seignorage revenues
are present in some form. In particular, under a
currency board, newly printed domestic money is
used to buy interest-bearing foreign reserves. Dollar-
ization entails losing this interest. It also entails buy-
ing back the domestic monetary base using foreign
reserves and, therefore, losing the interest on this
stock of reserves as well. Velde and Veracierto (1999)
calculate this latter number for Argentina to be $658
million, or 0.2 percent of GDP, per year.
Note that computing the present level of seignor-
age revenue and calling that a “cost” of dollarization
is clearly a mistake in most cases. Chang and Velasco
(2000b) make this point: If a country dollarizes in
order to lower its inflation rate, this reflects a deci-
sion that the benefits of lower inflation outweigh
the value of the revenue that higher inflation brings.
Instead, one should focus on the seignorage revenue
that would have been earned at the new, lower
inflation rate. This is the “loss” in seignorage revenue
relative to the (ideal) case where the inflation rate
is (somehow) lowered without dollarizing.
There are two reasons to believe that this amount
may still overestimate the true revenue loss from
dollarizing. First, a dollarizing country may be able
to negotiate a deal with the United States under
which it receives some of the increased U.S. seignor-
age revenue (which could equal the “loss” calcu-
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8 See also Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Summers (1999; 2000, p.8).
For a classification of different exchange rate regimes, see Frankel
(1999).
9 See Mussa et al. (2000), who argue that an unsustainable policy need
not be undesirable in the short run, and Frankel (1999), from whom
we borrowed the title of this section.lated above).10 Second, a large part of the reason
for dollarizing is to create a more stable economic
environment that will encourage investment and
growth. While it is extremely difficult to make quan-
titative predictions about the size of this effect, it is
clear that the increase in tax revenue from increased
economic activity should at least partially offset
the loss of seignorage revenue. 
Regarding this last point, however, it is impor-
tant to note that the increase in tax revenue would
take time to develop. In the meantime, a government
with lower revenues would have to decrease expen-
ditures, increase taxes, or increase the public debt.
To the extent that the loss of seignorage revenue is
compensated by an increase in government borrow-
ing, it may not be the case that a stable currency
necessarily provides more macroeconomic stability.
This is an indication that the fiscal plan accompany-
ing a dollarization would be critical to its success. 
32 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001
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10 Such a plan was actually proposed as part of the International
Monetary Stability Act, introduced by then Senator Connie Mack of
Florida. Details can be found in Mack (2000).
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Because dollarization entails a loss of both
seignorage revenue and independent monetary
policy, it is likely to have important consequences
for the conduct of fiscal policy. Sims (2001) argues
against dollarization for precisely this reason. He
argues that the option value of issuing fiat debt
(which can be defaulted on through inflation) is too
high to surrender because inflation is part of an
optimal taxation scheme. In support of his argument,
Sims computes the unexpected component of U.S.
government debt yields and shows that it is substan-
tial. His calculations show that fiat debt worked to
relax the government budget constraint in times
of high economic turmoil (such as the oil crisis of
1973). One possible interpretation of this fact is that,
without fluctuations in the unexpected component
of government bond yields, more variability would
have been observed in taxation and government
expenditure, which may have been very costly. More
research (as Sims acknowledges) is needed to eval-
uate (i) how much of the variability in the unexpected
component of government bond yields actually
reflects inefficient variation in monetary and fiscal
policy that is better avoided and (ii) how much of it
reflects an “optimal” response to real shocks.
Similarly, Chang and Velasco (2000b) argue that
an optimal taxation plan would always entail sur-
prise inflation (or devaluation) because this acts as
a lump-sum tax and therefore is non-distortionary.
Dollarization removes the ability of the government
to use this tax. The contributions of Sims (2000) and
Chang and Velasco (2000b) in this way stress the
potentially high costs of losing flexibility in econ-
omic policy. Surprise inflations, however, cannot
be repeatedly engineered, and anticipated inflation
is typically not part of an optimal taxation plan.
Hence the government has a time-consistency
problem; it wants to convince people that it will
not engineer an inflation increase, but once people
are convinced, it wants to surprise them. Because
people know this, the economy can end up in a
situation of anticipated inflation. If this problem is
very costly to the economy, then the benefit of using
dollarization to solve it may easily outweigh the
cost of the lost flexibility.11
Chang and Velasco (2000b) go on to point out
that dollarization might decrease the incentives for
fiscal discipline. Lack of fiscal discipline, in turn,
may mean that crises due to high sovereign default
risk would persist and the economy would not bene-
fit from lower interest rates. Would the adoption of
the dollar imply more or less fiscal discipline? Chang
(2000) argues that, under alternative arrangements,
changes in exchange rates or interest rates make
the costs of a lack of fiscal discipline immediate.
Dollarization would take those incentives away by
allowing the costs of present fiscal looseness to be
shifted to the future (in terms of higher future taxes,
for example). Hence the incentives for fiscal disci-
pline would decrease.
Although these incentive problems are real, it is
important to recognize that there are other factors
working in the opposite direction. First, as noted
above, emerging markets depend heavily on foreign
capital, and capital outflows could serve to make the
cost of a lack of fiscal discipline immediate. Second,
the incentive for domestic investors to monitor and
put political pressure on the government for fiscal
discipline would be higher. Heavy government bor-
rowing would be perceived to induce macroecon-
omic instability and would cause interest rates for
all domestic borrowers to increase. Through these
channels, market discipline would be present for a
dollarized government. 
If dollarization does undermine the incentives
for fiscal responsibility, does that mean it should
be accompanied by legal restrictions on the govern-
ment budget deficit? In part, this was the route taken
by the European Monetary Union (EMU) in tying
the Stability Pact to the launch of the euro. It is
important to notice, however, that a unilateral dollar-
ization is very different from the EMU’s in this regard.
In the latter case, members relinquished control to
a common central bank for the conduct of monetary
policy. The decision to dollarize, in contrast, entails
total loss of monetary authority. As such, legal
restrictions on the government budget would con-
strain an already shrunken set of policy alternatives,
which could prove very costly in an economic
downturn.12
Economic Integration
A potential benefit of dollarization is that it
could increase the level of integration of the dollar-
izing economy with the U.S. economy. This may
come about for several reasons, including reduced
transactions costs and the elimination of uncertainty
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11 On the optimal-tax property of inflation, see Calvo and Guidotti
(1993). For the analysis of time-consistency problems, see Kidland
and Precott (1977) and Calvo (1978).
12 Also, see Ghiglino and Shell (2000) for a discussion of when deficit
restrictions do not really constrain the government and hence have
no real effects.about exchange rates. Frankel and Rose (2000)
present evidence that currency unions lead to large
increases in trade flows between member coun-
tries.13 Furthermore, Frankel and Rose argue that
these increases do not come from the diversion of
trade away from non-member countries; rather,
currency union membership leads to a higher ratio
of total foreign trade to GDP. In fact, they interpret
their results as indicating that increased trade is
the primary benefit of joining a currency union (or
dollarizing).
In addition to increased trade, dollarization
could increase the level of financial integration
between the dollarizing country and the United
States. Stockman (2001) focuses on the “central bank
area” that would result from dollarization. He argues
that this would be the most important effect of
dollarization in Mexico—the Federal Reserve System
would become Mexico’s central bank. 
This scenario would lead to changes in mone-
tary policy (which Stockman defines broadly to
include supervisory and regulatory policies) that
would affect the incentives of financial intermedi-
aries and thereby affect the levels of investment
and financial integration. This change is important
because the level of financial development is
strongly related to economic growth and is shown
in some studies to cause growth14; thus, the poten-
tial benefits are indeed large.
Other studies, however, indicate that integration
should come before dollarization. For example,
Bencivenga, Huybens, and Smith (2001) show that
dollarization has a different impact depending on
the extent of the integration between the two
economies’ financial markets. They show that dol-
larization is beneficial when capital markets are
well integrated; otherwise, dollarization may be a
source of volatility and indeterminacy in the econ-
omy. Hence in their model, it is the ex ante level of
integration of capital markets that determines the
benefits of dollarization.
Bencivenga, Huybens, and Smith (2001) comple-
ment and extend the traditional optimal currency
literature, where it is the integration of real markets
that determines the boundaries of the optimal cur-
rency area. This theory is based on the work of
Mundell (1961) and specifically addresses the issue
of when two economies should use the same cur-
rency. According to the theory, the key issue in deter-
mining whether two economies fall in the same
optimal currency area is whether or not there is a
substantial benefit of having independent monetary
policy to accommodate asymmetric shocks to the
economies. An optimal currency area in general is
one where: (i) asymmetric shocks are not substan-
tial, (ii) there is high mobility of factors of produc-
tion, and (iii) prices are flexible. It is important to
keep in mind, however, that these considerations
have not been the motivation behind the current
interest in dollarization. 
Using the criteria of the literature on the tradi-
tional optimal currency area, it is hard to imagine
Argentina being in the same optimal currency area
as the United States. Even neighboring Mexico is
far from perfectly integrated with the U.S. economy.
The interest on dollarization fundamentally stems
from the desire to bring about financial stability.
The involvement of the banking sector in the recent
crises underlined the importance of this issue, which
is beyond the scope of the traditional optimal-
currency-area model.
The Lender of Last Resort Function 
A common argument against dollarization is
that it would severely limit the ability of the central
bank to act as a lender of last resort when the bank-
ing sector is in distress. One of the crucial roles that
banks perform is maturity transformation: taking
in short-term deposits and making long-term loans.
This naturally puts a bank at risk if, for whatever
reason, depositors have a sudden increase in their
demand for liquidity and want to withdraw their
money. When there is a domestic currency that
can be printed freely, the central bank always has
the ability to meet this liquidity demand by lending
cash to the banking sector. Banks can then repay
the loans when the crisis passes. In a dollarized
economy, the central bank would not have unlimited
resources to lend. The fear, therefore, is that giving
up the ability to print currency will make these types
of crises more frequent and/or more severe.
The emerging literature has shown that this
concern is likely overstated for several reasons. First,
the ability of the central bank to act as a lender of
last resort is equally limited under fixed exchange
rates and currency boards. Nevertheless, Argentina
has developed several other mechanisms to deal
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13 For a critique of their result and a review of the literature in contrast
with it, see Pakko and Wall (2001).
14 King and Levine (1993) show that financial development predicts
subsequent growth, and Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide evidence
of causation. See also Levine (1997). Levine and Carkovic (2001) argue
that the positive effects of dollarization would be indirect, working
through financial development.with liquidity crises. These include holding excess
foreign reserves (above those required to back the
currency in circulation), having banks contribute
to a deposit insurance fund, and contracting a type
of contingent credit line with foreign banks. Velde
and Veracierto (1999) calculate that, together, these
mechanisms cover 40 percent of total deposits.
Second, as Calvo (2001) points out, central banks
in industrialized countries do not generally perform
their lender-of-last-resort function by printing cur-
rency; they borrow instead. This was the case, for
example, in the banking crises in Sweden and
Finland in 1992. Third, as proposed by Calvo (2001)
and others, a “special fund” or a credit line guaran-
tee from an international lender of last resort could
be set up to guard against a large crisis that would
overwhelm domestic resources. One potential
source of revenue for the fund is the increase in
seignorage revenue that the United States would
receive when a country dollarizes. Since the fund
would likely increase the stability of dollarized-
country financial markets, this could be a productive
(and politically acceptable) use of the funds from
the U.S. point of view.15
Finally, several studies have identified the
domestic lender of last resort as a cause of both
excess volatility in emerging economies’ financial
markets and currency crises.16 This is largely related
to the moral hazard problem that such a lender can
create when the supervisory and regulatory aspects
of the banking system are underdeveloped. This
problem was particularly severe in East Asia and is
now thought to be one of the primary causes of
that crisis.17 A related problem is that the lender
of last resort might not be able to take the “right”
action in times of crisis because of heavy political
pressure. Ennis (2000), for example, shows how
such pressure may prevent the lender of last resort
from implementing the optimal policy and, instead,
force the use of a suboptimal inflation tax to bail
out a banking sector in distress. In this context,
dollarization works as an ex ante commitment not
to surrender to political pressure in the event of a
liquidity crisis. Antinolfi and Keister (2000) show
how dollarization can be seen as a way of commit-
ting to charge a (perhaps unpopular) “penalty rate”
on discount window loans during a crisis—exactly
the policy advocated by Bagehot (1873). These
studies indicate that dollarization can actually be
seen as fixing some of the problems created by a
lender of last resort.18 Such political-economy issues
have received relatively little emphasis in the litera-
ture on dollarization, and in our opinion they
deserve further research.
Existing Liability Dollarization
The set of initial conditions on which dollariza-
tion would be implemented is also crucial for under-
standing dollarization proposals. Our analysis would
be incomplete without a discussion of the current
state of an economy considering dollarizing, partic-
ularly with respect to existing liability dollarization.
Liability dollarization refers to domestic borrowing
denominated in or indexed to a foreign currency.
Both sovereign debt and private debt in emerging-
market economies are often dollarized. 
Our main concern in this section is private
sector dollar-denominated debt, which has been
growing rapidly in emerging-market economies.
This includes both direct borrowing by individual
firms and borrowing by the domestic banking sector.
Is widespread liability dollarization an indication
that an economy should officially dollarize? The
answer to this question must depend on what is
causing the liability dollarization to occur. Why
are firms willing to borrow in a foreign currency
when this creates a balance-sheet mismatch that
greatly increases their vulnerability to unexpected
devaluations?
Two types of explanations have been offered in
the literature. The first (see, for example, Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2001) is based on (implicit
or explicit) government guarantees of the liabilities,
especially those of the banking system. Under a fixed
exchange rate regime, the interest rate on dollar
loans will be lower than the domestic interest rate,
the difference reflecting the possibility of devalua-
tion. This condition leads banks to borrow in dollars.
In addition, because the government guarantee
implies that it will act as a residual claimant on bank
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15 Clearly, any such contribution of seignorage would be a matter for
the Congress and executive branch to decide.
16 See, for example, Chang and Velasco (2000a), Mishkin (1999), and
Fischer (1999). See also Antinolfi, Huybens, and Keister (2001), which
shows how a lender of last resort having the ability to print money
can allow inflationary beliefs to become self-fulfilling.
17 See Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) and Mishkin (1999) on this
topic.
18 But would dollarization itself find the necessary political support to
be implemented? Ennis (2000) goes on to show that this is possible if
the economy has a large population of international banks (i.e., banks
that operate in several countries). It is interesting to note that this is,
in essence, a form of financial-market integration, which we saw
above (in a different context) to be a factor that is likely to increase
the probability of success with dollarization.assets in bad states of the world (in which banks go
bankrupt), banks face no ex ante incentives to pur-
chase insurance against bad states of the world.
Hence, they do not hedge (sufficiently) against
foreign exchange risk. In other words, the guaran-
tee creates a moral hazard problem that leads to a
fragile banking system that is overexposed to cur-
rency risk. The reason the government would provide
this guarantee is that it reduces the interest rate that
domestic firms pay when financing working capital
from domestic banks and, therefore, has positive
effects on economic growth. This benefit the govern-
ment obtains is sufficient to overcome the cost of
increasing the probability of a banking crisis when
the exchange rate is devalued. This is an indication
that official dollarization may be warranted, as it
would bring this benefit without the cost.
The second type of explanation claims that lia-
bility dollarization is a result of underdeveloped
domestic financial markets (see Caballero and
Krishnamurthy, 2000). The underdevelopment
means that firms cannot pledge their entire return
to foreign investors. As a result, assets that can be
used as international collateral become essential.
In such an environment, individual firms choose
between borrowing in local currency (which is
immune to changes in the exchange rate) and bor-
rowing in dollars (which is cheaper). Caballero
and Krishnamurthy (2000) interpret borrowing in
domestic currency as purchasing insurance against
exchange rate fluctuations. They go on to show how
competitive markets mis-price this insurance. This
problem happens because, at the firm level, there
are two types of collateral—internationally accepted
and domestically accepted assets. At the economy-
wide level, however, only internationally accepted
assets are net collateral. Because firms “overesti-
mate” the amount of collateral that they have avail-
able, they tend to purchase less insurance than would
otherwise be optimal. If this is the reason for the
observed liability dollarization, it is less clear that
officially dollarizing would help matters. The prob-
lem of scarce internationally accepted collateral
may still arise. In this case, the benefit of official
dollarization is likely to be indirect—through the
development of domestic financial markets and
their integration with international markets.
The Effects from the Perspective of the
United States
Our discussion so far has focused on the poten-
tial costs and benefits of dollarization from the
viewpoint of the economy considering dollarizing.
The view of dollarization from the perspective of
the United States is also important. When Ecuador
and El Salvador adopted the dollar, the impact on
the United States was clearly minimal. It is doubtful
that the same could be said about Argentina or,
especially, Mexico. Two areas where a large dollar-
ization could have an important impact on the
United States are seignorage revenue and the con-
duct of monetary policy.
We have discussed above how dollarization
entails a transfer of seignorage revenue from the
dollarizing government to the United States. We have
also discussed how the dollarizing country might
like to either receive a share of this money or have
it set aside in a fund for lender-of-last-resort func-
tions. The second plan might receive more support
in the United States, since otherwise the United
States would possibly be directly involved in trying
to alleviate banking crises. This possibility intro-
duces interesting questions about the relationship
between the United States and the dollarized econ-
omies that the literature has yet to explore. To the
extent that the United States perceives there to be
costs to having the dollar used widely, it may be
reluctant to give up the benefit of the extra revenue.
The financial integration with the United States
that could follow a dollarization is commonly con-
sidered to be a major benefit of dollarizing. Arguably,
financial integration can prove to be a major benefit
also for the U.S. economy. In addition, however, U.S.
monetary policy will have stronger effects abroad,
and the United States might have to take these
effects into account. As an example, suppose there
is a recession in a dollarized Mexico that calls for a
looser policy while events in the United States call
for a tighter policy. Although the United States would
have the option of ignoring events in Mexico, doing
so would likely cause a significant increase in the
flow of illegal immigrants into the United States.
Hence the optimal policy (from a selfish point of
view) would likely be looser than it would have been
had Mexico kept the peso.19 In this way, it is not only
the dollarizing economy that is losing monetary




19 For an analysis of the potential relation between dollarization and
Mexican migration to the United States see Borjas and O’N. Fisher
(2001). Their results indicate that the flow of illegal immigrants is
more volatile when Mexican authorities adopt a fixed exchange rate,
whereas the flow of legal immigrants remains unaffected.As a final (and highly speculative) note, we
observe that, if the United States benefits from the
increase in seignorage revenue, widespread dollar-
ization would give an incentive to generate a higher
steady-state level of inflation. Although it seems
unlikely that this incentive would influence U.S.
policy, it is interesting to report how Fischer (1982)
concludes his paper: 
Use of a foreign money also implies that the
domestic government is relying on the for-
eign government to maintain better control
over the inflation rate than it does itself—
an admission that most governments would
be reluctant to make. And besides, Who is to
guard the guardians?
FURTHER READING
We have discussed some of the key issues that
are important for a country considering official
dollarization, including some of the likely costs and
benefits. A crucial issue that we have not discussed,
however, is how large these costs and benefits would
be. There is little historical evidence that can be used
as guidance on this question. There are many inher-
ent difficulties in quantifying the effects of dollar-
ization, and these are reflected in a wide range of
predictions that are obtained from different models
that focus on different aspects of the problem. An
example of this disparity can be found in the results
of Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Del Negro and
Obiols-Homs (2001), Mendoza (2001), and Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2001), all of which are quantitative
studies related to dollarization in Mexico. Some of
these papers conclude that the overall benefits
would be very large, while others conclude they
would be small or even negative. 
All four of these papers, along with some others
we have referenced and some we have not, are
gathered together in a special issue of the Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking (May 2001). We encour-
age the interested reader to consult this source
directly for a more extensive discussion of the
issues related to dollarization than is possible here.
In addition, Spanish-speaking readers are encour-
aged to consult La Dolarización como Alternativa
Monetaria para México (Del Negro et al., forthcom-
ing). This volume consists largely of papers presented
at a conference on dollarization sponsored by the
Instituto Technológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
in December 2000.
REFERENCES 
Antinolfi, Gaetano; Huybens, Elisabeth and Keister, Todd.
“Monetary Stability and Liquidity Crises: The Role of the
Lender of Last Resort.” Journal of Economic Theory, 2001,
99(1-2), pp. 187-219.
___________ and Keister, Todd. “Liquidity Crises and
Discount Window Lending: Theory and Implications for
the Dollarization Debate.” Working Paper 00-02, Centro
de Investigación Económica, September 2000.
Bagehot, Walter. Lombard Street. London: William Clowes
and Sons, 1873.
Bencivenga, Valerie; Huybens, Elisabeth and Smith, Bruce
D. “Dollarization and the Integration of International
Capital Markets: A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal
Currency Areas.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
May 2001, 33(2, Part 2), pp. 548-89.
Borjas, George J. and O’N. Fisher, Eric. “Dollarization and
the Mexican Labor Market.” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, May 2001, 33(2, Part 2), pp. 626-47.
Burnside, Craig; Eichenbaum, Martin and Rebelo, Sergio.
“Hedging and Financial Fragility in Fixed Exchange Rate
Regimes.” European Economic Review, 2001, 45(7), pp.
1151-93.
Caballero, Ricardo J. and Krishnamurthy, Arvind.
“Dollarization of Liabilities: Underinsurance and Domestic
Financial Underdevelopment.” Working Paper No. 7792,
National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2000.
Calvo, Guillermo A. “On the Time Consistency of Optimal
Policy in a Monetary Economy.” Econometrica, 1978,
46(6), pp. 1411-28.
___________. “Balance of Payments Crises in Emerging
Markets: Large Capital Inflows and Sovereign
Governments,” in Paul Krugman, ed., Currency Crises.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
___________. “Capital Markets and the Exchange Rate,
with Special Reference to the Dollarization Debate in
Latin America.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
May 2001, 33(2, Part 2), pp. 312-34.
___________ and Guidotti, Pablo E. “On the Flexibility of
Monetary Policy: The Case of the Optimal Inflation Tax.”
Review of Economic Studies, 1993, 60, pp. 667-87.
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001      37
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS___________ and Reinhart, Carmen M. “When Capital
Inflows Come to a Sudden Stop: Consequences and
Policy Options.” Unpublished manuscript, June 1999.
___________ and ___________. “Fear of Floating.”
Unpublished manuscript, September 2000.
Chang, Roberto. “Dollarization: A Scorecard.” Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, Third Quarter
2000, 85(3), pp. 1-11.
___________ and Velasco, Andres. “Financial Fragility and
the Exchange Rate Regime.” Journal of Economic Theory,
2000a, 92(1), pp. 1-34.
___________ and ___________. “Dollarization: Analytical
Issues.” Unpublished manuscript, August 2000b.
Cooley, Thomas F. and Quadrini, Vincenzo. “The Costs of
Losing Monetary Independence: The Case of Mexico.”
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 2001, 33(2, Part 2),
pp. 370-97.
Corsetti, Giancarlo; Pesenti, Paolo and Roubini, Nouriel.
“What Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?”
Japan and the World Economy, 1999, 11, pp. 305-73.
De Grauwe, Paul. International Money. 2nd Ed. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996.
Del Negro, Marco; Huybens, Elisabeth and Hernández-
Delgado, Alejandro, eds., La Dolarización como Alternativa
Monetaria para México. Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura
Económica, forthcoming.
___________ and Obiols-Homs, Francesc. “Has Monetary
Policy Been So Bad That It Is Better to Get Rid of It?”
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, May 2001, 33(2,
Part 2), pp. 404-33.
Edwards, Sebastian. Real Exchange Rates, Devaluation, and
Adjustment. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989.
___________. “International Capital Flows and the Emerging
Markets: Amending the Rules of the Game?” Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series 43, June 1999,
pp. 137-57.
Eichengreen, Barry. “What Problems Can Dollarization
Solve?” Journal of Policy Modeling, forthcoming.
Ennis, Huberto M. “Banking and the Political Support for
Dollarization.” Working Paper 00-12, Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, December 2000.
Fischer, Stanley. “Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar
View Correct?” Distinguished Lecture on Economics in
Government, American Economic Association Meetings,
January 2001. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/
2001/010601a.htm>.
___________. “On the Need for an International Lender of
Last Resort.” Journal of Economic Perspective, Fall 1999,
13, pp. 85-104.
___________. “Seignorage and the Case for a National
Money.” Journal of Political Economy, 1982, 90(2), pp.
295-313.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. “No Single Currency Regime Is Right for
All Countries at All Times.” Working Paper No. 7338,
National Bureau for Economic Research, September 1999.
___________ and Rose, Andrew K. “Estimating the Effects
of Currency Unions on Trade and Output.” Working Paper
No. 7857, National Bureau for Economic Research,
August 2000.
Ghiglino, Christian and Shell, Karl. “The Economic Effects
of Restrictions on Government Budget Deficits.” Journal
of Economic Theory, 2000, 94(1), pp. 106-37.
Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Reinhart, Carmen M. “The Twin
Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments
Problems.” American Economic Review, 1999, 89, pp.
473-500.
King, Robert G. and Levine, Ross. “Finance, Entrepreneur-
ship, and Growth.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 1993,
33(3), pp. 513-42.
Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C. “Rules Rather
Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.”
Journal of Political Economy, 1977, 85(3), pp. 473-92.
Levine, Ross. “Financial Development and Economic
Growth: Views and Agenda.” Journal of Economic
Literature, 1997, 35(2), pp. 688-726.
___________ and Carkovic, Maria. “How Much Bang for the
Buck? Mexico and Dollarization.” Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking, May 2001, 33(2, Part 2), pp. 339-63.
Mack, Connie. “Dollarization and Cooperation to Achieve
38 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001
REVIEWSound Money.” Speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas, 6 March 2000. <http://www.dallasfed.org/
htm/dallas/events/mack.html>.
Mendoza, Enrique G. “The Benefits of Dollarization When
Stabilization Policy Lacks Credibility and Financial
Markets Are Imperfect.” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 2001, 33(2, Part 2), pp. 440-74.
Mishkin, Frederic S. “Lessons from the Asian Crisis.”
Journal of International Money and Finance, 1999, 18, pp.
709-23.
Mundell, Robert. “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.”
American Economic Review, 1961, 51, pp. 657-65.
Mussa, Michael; Masson, Paul; Swoboda, Alesander; Jadresic,
Esteban; Mauro, Paolo; Berg, Paolo and Berg, Andy.
“Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated
World Economy.” Occasional Paper No. 193, International
Monetary Fund, August 2000.
Neely, Christopher J. “An Introduction to Capital Controls.”
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/
December 1999, 81(6), pp. 13-30.
Obstfeld, Maurice and Rogoff, Kenneth. “The Mirage of
Fixed Exchange Rates.” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Fall 1995, 9(4), pp. 73-96.
Pakko, Michael R. and Wall, Howard J. “Reconsidering the
Trade-Creating Effects of a Currency Union.” Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/October
2001, 83(5), pp. 37-46.
Rajan, Raghuram G. and Zingales, Luigi. “Financial
Dependence and Growth.” American Economic Review,
1998, 88, pp. 559-86.
Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie and Uribe, Martín. “Stabilization
Policy and the Cost of Dollarization,” Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking, 2001, 33(2, Part 2), pp. 482-509.
Sims, Christopher A. “Fiscal Consequences for Mexico
Adopting the Dollar.” Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, 2001, 33(2, Part 2), pp. 597-616.
Stockman, Alan C. “Optimal Central Bank Areas, Financial
Intermediation, and Mexican Dollarization.” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, May 2001, 33(2, Part 2), pp.
648-66.
Summers, Lawrence H. “International Financial Crises:
Causes, Prevention, and Cures.” American Economic
Review, 2000, 90(2), pp. 1-16.
___________. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee in International Economic Policy and
Export/Trade Promotion, 27 January 1999.
Velde, François R. and Veracierto, Marcelo. “Dollarization
in Argentina.” Chicago Fed Letter No. 142, June 1999.
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001      39
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST.L OUIS40 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2001
REVIEW